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PUBLIC R&D FUNDING: DOES THE SOURCE DETERMINE THE STRATEGY? 
 
Abstract: 
The aim of this study is to analyze whether the receipt of public funding for innovation determines for 
present and future a firm’s choice of R&D strategy. We consider three R&D strategies: make R&D in-house, buy 
R&D and, combined make-buy R&D. The analysis uses a sample of 457 large firms for the period 1992-2005, 
taken from the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies. Estimation of a multinomial logit model with random 
effects shows that the positive effect of public funding varies according to the source of the aid, so, while State 
and Regional funds  have a long term effect,  other financial aid (such as EU grants) has only short-term effect. 
The second relevant finding is that the source of the aid also influences whether the firm selects the make,  buy 
or  make-buy strategies. 
Keywords: R&D Strategy, Public Financial Aid; Multinomial logit, Panel Data  
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1. Introduction  
Public policies on innovation play an essential role in the long-term growth and prosperity of 
any region. Public administrative bodies have designed a wide range of mechanisms to promote 
innovation in firms as a mean to correct the market failures typically associated with innovation. 
Different levels of government put great effort into implementing measures to improve the economic 
performance of the firms and other social objectives under their jurisdiction. However, as recent papers 
have reported,1 the discussion has become focused on the need to assess the effectiveness of these 
measures.  
Most of the research on the effectiveness of public intervention is based on the concept of 
additionality (Luukkonen 2000), that is, measuring the extent to which public intervention gives rise to 
a new activity or outcome that would not otherwise have come into being. Most of this work adopts 
one of three analytic approaches: the influence of policies on R&D input levels (Branstetter and 
Sakakibara 1998; Almus and Czarnitzki 2003; García-Quevedo 2004), the influence on innovation 
behaviour (Huggins 2001; Polt and Streicher 2005; OECD 2006) and the influence on the outcome of 
the innovation process (Branstetter and Sakkibara 1998; Klette and Moen 1999; Huggins 2001; 
Benfratello and Sembenelli 2002; Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco 2010).  
Against this background, this paper sets out with the main purpose of shedding some light on 
the effect of public R&D support policies by evaluating additionality through behaviour indicators. 
There has been little research on issues as crucial as how to tell whether government fund influences 
the type of R&D undertaken by firms, or the way R&D is carried out or whether the support generates 
long-term research or simply has a one-off effect (Georghiou and Clarysse 2006). In this sense, we aim 
at answering whether  public funding  influences the R&D strategy  selection, assuming three possible 
                                                 
1
 Georghiou and Roessner (2000); Klette, Moen and Griliches (2000); Luukkonen (2000); Salter and Martín (2001); Jaffe 
(2002) Almus and Czarnitzki (2003); Roper et al. (2004) OECD (2006); Bayona-Saéz and García-Marco (2010) among 
others 
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strategies: in-house R&D (make), outsourced R&D (buy), or  the combination of  both (make-buy). 
This issue is particularly important because, as previous literature has shown,  each strategy  has 
different effects on the innovation outcome..  Previous evidence appears to suggest that the buy strategy  
is a less effective driver of innovation, and  sometimes has  a negative influence on firm innovativeness 
. According to the evidence analyzed in this paper, however, the  make strategy has a  positive impact 
on innovation output, while the  make-buy strategy seems to generate the best innovative results 
(Veugelers and Cassiman 2006, Cruz-Cazares, Bayona-Sáez and García-Marco 2010) Therefore, it is 
crucial for policy makers to evaluate whether the public funds foster the correct strategy according to 
the objectives pursued.  
.  . 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, while a large proportion of the research focuses 
on a particular country or region and a specific public initiative, there have been few attempts  
performing simultaneous analysis of the additionality effect that fund coming from different 
government levels has on innovation behaviour This paper, in contrast, studies the effect that funds 
from Regional governments, State and other sources, including the European Union have on Spanish 
firms. We consider important to evaluate the behavioural effect of different public funds in the R&D 
strategy selection as innovations are the main source of social and economical wealth (Baumol, 2002).  
 
Second, methodologically, the related literature is often based on case studies or interviews with 
firms, or the results come from cross-sectional and relatively small samples Our contribution in this 
respect is to use a panel data set for the 1992-2005 period containing information on 457 Spanish firms 
with over 200 workers. The data were drawn from the Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales 
(Business Strategy Survey). Furthermore, the technique used,  multinomial logit model with random 
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effects,  allows us to overcome endogeneity  problems  and control for the unobserved heterogeneity, 
obtaining a more accurate approximation, and drawing causal inferences.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the theoretical framework and the 
different types of funding available to Spanish firms and briefly presents the evidence on the 
repercussions of different R&D strategies on innovation behaviour. Section 3 describes the database,  
variables and  methodology issues. The results are discussed in section 4, and the main conclusions are 
summarized in the final section.  
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Public R&D funding and the behaviour perspective: a review of the literature 
The proliferation of public initiatives to support innovation has stimulated interest in assessing 
its effectiveness. The effect of public innovation policies on business is usually analyzed through three 
different perspectives: the impact on R&D inputs, innovation behaviour and the output achievement. .  
The most thoroughly investigated aspect is the impact of public funding    for R&D 
expenditures . Research has been conducted at sector, region and business level using a variety of 
methods. Among the many findings, some cases have showed  complementarity and others  
substitution between public and private funds. An exhaustive review of the related literature can be 
found in David, Bronwyn and Toole (2000), García-Quevedo (2004) and Lööf and Hesmati (2005). 
From an output perspective the existing literature is also patently diverse both in terms of the 
findings and the output measures used. A survey of this research is reported in Klette, Moen and 
Griliches (2000), which is an analysis of evaluative studies of the effect of various public initiatives on 
a number of firm performance measures, such as sales growth, investment in physical assets, return 
over assets or sales, labour productivity, and factor productivity growth.  
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This paper focuses on the third of these perspectives: innovation behaviour, aiming to explore 
the effect of three different public R&D funding as drivers of the R&D strategy selection. In this 
respect, additionality in behaviour is defined as the differences taking place in the firm’s innovation 
behaviour after receiving  public funding. This is the least common approach in econometric studies 
dealing with the effects of public R&D funding. However, for politicians attempting to compare the 
effectiveness of different policy instruments, it will be useful to see how the government program has 
affected firms’ R&D behaviour and management. 
Most of the studies on additionality in behaviour are based on firm-survey responses (see Polt 
and Streicher 2005; and OECD 2006). Many of the cited firms state that without public funding some 
projects would never have got underway, or at least not on the same scale or at the same speed. The 
surveyed firms also claim to have acquired skills and competencies that can be exploited in future 
innovation projects, and also to have strengthened their networks and collaboration with other firms 
(Georghiou and Clarysse 2006). 
Specifically, some of the studies listed in the OECD publication, such as Australian Department 
of Industry, Tourism and Resources (2006), have found that  those firms that had received a 
government subsidy had increased their R&D commitment, carried out larger-scale projects requiring 
consultants (R&D outsourcing), and had developed a more rigorous, well-planned R&D management 
method Falk (2006) stresses that participation in a government-funded initiative helped firms to 
increase their R&D skills, allowing them to take on new projects in the future. The Austrian firms 
surveyed by Steyer (2006) modify their R&D strategy: they increased the percentage of their 
outsourcing R&D expenditure from 10% to 22% in four years. Hyvärinen (2006) observed that  Finnish 
firms receiving public funding engaged in higher-risk and longer-term projects,  and increased their 
R&D capacity through more highly skilled personnel. 
2.2. Public innovation support programs for Spanish firms  
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In the Spanish context, there are three sources to which firms can apply for aid; Regional 
(Autonomous Community) governments, the State and other public authorities, including the European 
Union. The different levels serve different objectives, so it is likely that the impact of the funding will 
vary with the source.  
Some of the state funding programs have existed over 20 years2. Various initiatives have 
coexisted in Spain, with a range of objectives including the promotion of basic and precompetitive 
research as part of the National R&D Plan, which calls for sustained in-house R&D and has sometimes 
resulted in collaboration between firms and universities or research centres. There have also been 
initiatives on the part of the Ministry of Industry and Energy to encourage innovation, technological 
development and the incorporation of advanced technology into the industrial fabric (Acosta and 
Modrego 2001). This funding is aimed at growing markets and enabling firms  to compete 
technologically (Heijs et al. 2005). 
 The range of Regional governments programs is very wide and very difficult to generalize. 
Nevertheless, some studies (Blanes and Busom 2004) report that the selection criteria for funding  is 
not very strict, but their predominant target are SMEs  .  This Regional funding sometimes tends to 
favour firms in shrinking markets (Heijs et al. 2005) and provides a full range of support and  
beneficiaries firms are less experienced or less active in innovation than the type of firm targeted by 
State  funding.  
Finally, a feature that distinguishes the European funding from those described above is that 
they require mandatory developing in-house R&D since only purchasing or outsourcing R&D is not 
allowed.  When collaborating, the European  programs demand  that the participant firms  should be 
from a least two different EU countries. In other words, EU funding is intended for cooperative, 
international research, something which is more feasible for larger firms. The European funds focus on 
                                                 
2
 In fact, the first National R&D Plan ran from 1988 to 1991 and each three years a the Plan is rebuilt according to the new 
technological demands.  
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frontier technology in basic R&D projects; the requirements are formal and the candidates are leading 
firms with sufficient technological skills to ensure the technological success of the projects (Heijs et al. 
2005). Firms with high innovation capability usually are the receipt of these funds.  
2.3. R&D strategy selection and innovation performance 
 R&D strategy aims  to guide the firm in acquiring, developing  and applying  technology to 
generate a competitive advantage. Therefore, firms have to select the strategy best suited to their 
technological requirements. Traditionally, studies have analyzed three R&D strategies commonly 
called make, buy and, the combination of both, make-buy. As described in some papers, each of them 
has its advantages and disadvantages (Veugelers and Cassiman 1999; Cho and Yu 2000; Mol 2005).  
Theoretical arguments indicate that the buy strategy outperforms the make strategy since it 
allows risk calculation a priori, offers solutions to capacity problems and increases the speed to access 
to new knowledge (West, 2002). Nevertheless, it implies high transactional cost, high risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, external dependences and coordination problems that might reduce its impact 
on firm innovativeness (Kotable and Hensen 1999; Narula 2001). On the other hand, in-house R&D 
facilitates the information flow between the involved departments, constitutes a unique source of 
knowledge, allows an objective valuation of the problems and reduces transaction costs (West, 2002). 
Perrons and Platts (2004) argue that the make strategy is more risky and results are less predictable and 
the firm could remain isolated in one specific technology.  
Empirical evidence shows that the buy strategy usually has negative effects on product and 
process innovations (Kessler, Bierly and Gopalakrishnan 2000; Lanctot and Swan 2000; Jones, Lanctot 
and Teegen 2001; Fey and Birkinshaw 2005). However, some others studies found positive effects of 
outsourced R&D on product innovation but the make strategy presented a higher impact (Chen and 
Yuan 2007; Haro-Domínguez et al. 2007; Santamaría, Nieto and Barge-Gil 2009) 
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The open innovation and absorptive capacity approaches stress that combining internal and 
external creates synergies that ends with a better innovative performance rather than solely making of 
buying. The open innovation approach indicates that due to the complexity of current products it is no 
feasible to develop everything in-house and argues that the main innovations come from the 
combination of internal and external knowledge (Chesbrough 2003). On the other hand, Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) defend the idea that a firm is not able to assimilate and integrate external knowledge 
if it does not have the absorptive capacity gained through the internal R&D. Empirical evidence is not 
conclusive since Schmiedeberg (2008) did not observed better performance of the make-buy strategy 
and  Tsai and Wang’s (2009) results through a  negative effect but on the other hand, Veugelers and 
Cassiman (2006) and  Cruz-Cázares, Bayona-Sáez and Garcia-Marco (2010) found that the make-buy 
strategy produces a better innovative performance.  
In a broad consensus, it seems that the buy strategy produces the lower innovative results and 
that the make strategy outperformers the buy strategy. Theoretically, and supported with some 
empirical evidence, it is supposed that combining in-house and external R&D is the best R&D strategy. 
Therefore, we consider crucial to observe whether, for the Spanish case, the public R&D funds 
encourage firms to select those strategies with a larger effect on firm innovativeness.  
3. Database, variables and methodology 
The Spanish Business Strategy Survey (henceforth SBSS) used in our empirical analysis is a 
firm-level panel dataset of manufacturing firms covering the period from 1990 to 2005. The survey is 
compiled by the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Public Enterprise Foundation (FUNEP). 
It is random and stratified by industry sector and firm size (Fariñas and Jaumandreu 2000).  It provides 
information on markets, customers, products, employment, outcome results, corporate strategy, human 
resources and technological activities. The aim of the SBSS is to document the evolution of the 
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characteristics of Spanish firms and the strategies they use.  For the purposes of our analysis we have 
selected the data pertaining to large firms with over 200 workers.  
We selected large firms since  several studies have found that large firms are the principal ones 
in receiving public R&D funding (Wallsten 2000; Lach 2002; Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004; Madrid 
and García 2009). In fact, in SBSS sample the percentage of medium and small firms receiving public 
R&D funding is very low, (2.07% and 9.2%, respectively). According Blanes and Busom (2004) and 
Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), large firms receive more funding because they are more willing to 
undertake innovations projects since they can afford the fix costs associated to those projects. 
Additionally, they are more prone to apply for public funding as they have larger organizational 
resources to face the bureaucracy and paperwork inherent to the process when requesting the public 
funds (Czarnitzki and Hussinger 2004). Moreover, some public administrations might prefer to support 
large firms as they believe that their projects have more possibilities of success (Blanes and Busom 
2004).   
The final sample comprises 3941 observations for 457 firms, 72 of which (16 %) presented a 
complete panel3. 72.36% of these 457 firms performed some sort of R&D in at least one year of the 
period considered , from which 50.11 % had adopted the make strategy, 39.37 %) the make-buy ; and 
10.52 %  the buy strategy. 
R&D strategy (RD_ST), which is the dependent variable in the model, is defined in terms of 
four levels: 1 = no R&D, 2 = make, 3 = buy  and 4 = make-buy. This is a categorical unordered 
variable, taken directly from the  SBSS representing activities at time t. Firms were asked to answer the 
following question: Mark below if your firm performed in-house,  outsourced R&D or combined both. 
The different levels are, by definition, mutually exclusive. Following Parmigiani (2007), in order to 
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 The panel data is  not balanced since some firms ceased to provide information and some others were added. Due to the 
availability of information, our sample covers the period from 1992 to 2005. Firms included in the final sample had to be in 
the panel for at least four consecutive years.  
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ensure that the make-buy strategy truly represents the combination of both strategies, it was recoded 
from the original data as follows: firms that had opted for make-buy and had assigned less than 10% of 
their total R&D expenditure to outsourced R&D at time t, were recoded as adopters of the make 
strategy; the same less than 10% criterion was applied to in-house R&D expenditure. Firms whose in-
house and outsourced R&D expenditures were both greater than 10% of the total remained  within the 
make-buy category.   
We have three independent variables which capture each of the public R&D funding:  the 
Neperian log of R&D funding,  Regional funding (RF), State funding (SF) and funding from other 
levels of governance, including the European Union (OF). These variables were calculated as the 
Neperian log of R&D funding and are included in the model at t, t-1 and t-2 aiming to determine 
whether the receipt of funding has a long- or short-term effect in determining the R&D strategy 
selection. 
 The first control variable is human capital which is measured as the percentage of engineers 
and graduates among the total number of workers (GP).  It is one of firm’s internal resources that will 
influence its capacity to design and implement R&D projects (Blanes and Busom 2004) and whether 
the R&D can be performed in-house, using ideas proposed and developed by the firm’s own employees  
and could also facilitate the acquisition and assimilation of external knowledge. 
The second control variable is the technological intensity  which captures whether  firms belong 
to a sector with high (HTI), medium (MTI) or low technological intensity (LTI). This variable was 
recoded as  in the SBSS  the industrial sector variable is divided into 20 different industries based 
CNAE-93 classification.  
The remaining control variables are age (AGEt), and firm size (SIZE). The first one  captures 
demographic organizational characteristics such as leadership capacity, entrepreneurship, etc… and  
derived from the difference between the year the firm was founded and time t.  Firm size   was 
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calculated from the Neperian log of total turnover. All control variables were included in the model, 
presented below, at time t and time dummies representing each year of the data are also included 
  
  RDSit =  β1RFit+β2RFit-1+ β3RFit-2+β4SFit + β5SFit-1 + β6SFit-2 + β7OFit + β8OFit-1  + β9OFit-2 + β10GPit + β11 
Sizeit+ β12Ageit+  β13MTIit +  β14HTIit +γi + εit               (1) 
The panel structure of the sample  allows the use of panel data estimation techniques.  Although 
observations tend to be correlated, the problem can be solved by introducing random effects.  In our 
case, the appropriate model is the multinomial logit model with random effects, which has the 
advantage of allowing for control of unobserved heterogeneity and stronger causal inference (Hsiao 
1985). 
The model is estimated using gllamm, a Stata4 module for maximum likelihood estimation of 
generalized linear latent and mixed models. This software has the capacity to estimate multi-level, 
mixed, and hierarchical regression models with binary or ordinal dependent variables and possible 
latent (unobserved) variables and random effects at any level. The Newton–Raphson algorithm is 
implemented in gllamm to calculate maximum likelihood using first and second derivatives (Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh 2003). The best way to integrate the random effects, in order to obtain the marginal 
response distribution, is using the Gaussian adaptive quadrature (GAQ) method, which improves the 
robustness of the results when working with large numbers of observations and between-group 
correlation (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal and Pickles 2004). The Huber/White/sandwich estimator is used 
to estimate the matrix of covariance of the estimated parameter to obtain a robust variance and adjusted 
between-group correlation coefficients.  
                                                 
4
 Stata. is a statistical tool covering advanced techniques, such as survival models, dynamic panel data (DPD) regressions, 
generalized estimating equations (GEE), multilevel mixed models, linear and generalized linear models (GLM), regressions 
with count or binary outcomes, ANOVA/MANOVA, ARIMA, cluster analysis, etc.. For further information see 
www.stata.com 
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4. Results 
Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables used in the models. As 
the table shows, most of the firms (38% approx.) belong to the high-tech sectors; the next group are the 
firms from the low-tech sector (36%) and the last are those from the medium-tech sector (25%). The 
average age of the firms is high (about 35 years). 
[Insert Table 1] 
With respect to average funding received, a few remarks are due regarding the data in Table 2, 
which, unlike those in the previous table, are expressed in thousands of Euros rather than Neperian 
logs. The means and standard deviations shown on the left-hand side of Table 2 refer to the whole 
sample of firms, receivers and non-receivers of funding alike, while the figures that appear on the right-
hand side of the table refer exclusively to receivers, thus enabling us to calculate average funding 
received.  
[Insert Table 2] 
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Focusing on those firms that received funding, it can be seen that the most frequent source is the 
State (582 assignations in all). It is also the most generous, with a mean payout of nearly 360 thousand 
Euros. The next most frequent sources are the Regional funding (375 assignations). Other sources, 
including the European Union, come last with 246 assignations. In terms of mean amounts, other 
sources surpass the  Regional funding. These results are in line with those obtained (also for the 
Spanish context) by Blanes and Busom (2004). 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are given in Table 3. 
We perform our first estimation, leaving no R&D as a reference category. Thus, the results that 
appear in the first three columns of Table 3 shows that, when taking no R&D as a reference, R&D 
funding, whether it is from the  Regional (RF),  State (SF) or any other public (OF) body, has a positive 
effect in that it is associated more strongly with the make, buy or the combined make-buy R&D 
strategies than with the no R&D strategy. In other words, the receipt of R&D funding, as might be 
expected, encourages any R&D strategy. But, aiming to answering our question whether the source 
determine the strategy we re-estimate the model changing the reference variable twice for make and 
buy instead of no R&D, as can be observed for models (4), (5) and (6) of Table 35. The purpose of this 
was to test for significant differences between the estimated coefficients and the coefficients for the 
reference category in each case. 
 
  
As the data show,  Regional funding  appears to increase the firm’s probability of selecting the 
combined make-buy strategy rather than the make strategy, but no significant differences can be 
observed between make versus buy or make-buy versus buy. Thus, Regional funding appears to make a 
                                                 
5
 Estimates of the re-estimation are only presented for those strategies not already included in the previous estimations. 
 15 
firm slightly more likely to adopt the combined strategy than to opt for in-house R&D alone, but makes 
no difference otherwise.  
State funding, meanwhile, increases the firm’s probability of selecting the combined make-buy 
strategy rather than either of the others. This finding is in-line with that of Steyer (2006) where, 
following participation in a State program, firms could be seen to increase their external R&D 
expenditure by up to 22%, which places them by our criteria in the combined make-buy category.  
Finally, the receipt of aid from other sources, including the European Union, increases the 
firm’s probability of selecting either of the other two strategies rather than the buy strategy on its own. 
This result may be consonant with the typology of European projects, which are undertaken on a 
cooperative basis and therefore require participating firms to perform in-house R&D and not rely on 
outsourcing alone. 
[Insert Table 3] 
If we look more closely at the potential medium-term effect (t-1) of receiving R&D funding, the 
outcome appears to vary according to the source of the funding.  First, Regional funding seems not to 
have any effect on the R&D strategy selection. State fund has a medium-term effect on their probability 
of performing R&D activities. This fund incentives firms in selecting any of the R&D strategies and 
seems to foster the selection of the make-buy strategy over make. However, there seems not to be a 
difference between make and buy. Regarding the other funding, at t-1 interesting results appear since 
the make-buy strategy is preferred over buy but the make is preferred over make-buy and buy.   
The long-term effect (t-2) of the public R&D funding seems to be limited to the Regional and 
State funding. This is interesting because we might have expected a larger effect of the State fund due 
to the higher amount they financed but the Regional fund has a stronger presence in the long term. It is 
important to highlight that both found affect in prompting the adoption of the make-buy strategy over 
the others.  
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 In conclusion therefore, we find that the duration of the effects of financial aid on the choice of 
R&D strategy depends on the source. The reason for the variation may have to do with the objectives 
the funding is meant to target, which, as we have already mentioned, are not always the same. Thus, 
Regional funding , who tend to be the least selective when deciding which firms to support and also to 
assign lower mean amounts, has  a contemporaneous and large-effect impact on R&D  selection. In 
both contemporaneous and long-term effect seems to encourage firms in selecting the make-buy 
strategy rather than the make, but distinction is between make-buy and buy. State aid,  involving higher 
mean amounts, increase the probability for selecting the complementarity strategy at a 
contemporaneous, medium- and long-term effect.  
 Finally, funding from other sources, including the European Union, has no long-term impact. Our 
results suggest that these sources, which provide funding for cooperative projects, do not encourage the 
adoption of the buy strategy, which, according to the evidence we have analyzed, has the least 
demonstrable, sometimes negative, impact on innovation output. 
 Our findings from the control variables show that the higher the technological intensity of the 
sector, the greater the firm’s probability of adopting some R&D strategy, but none more than any other. 
In terms of the workforce skills level, a higher proportion of engineers and graduates among its 
employees makes a firm more likely to opt for R&D versus no R&D, while also increasing the 
probability of selecting make and buy versus make. We also find a significant, positive impact of firm 
size on the probability of selecting the make-buy strategy versus either of the other two and the buy 
strategy versus no R&D. Finally, we obtain that the probability of selecting the buy strategy increases 
with firm age.  
 
5. Conclusions 
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This paper fits into the literature on the effect of public R&D funding for businesses. Its specific 
aim is to examine various sources of public funding from the behavioural perspective to investigate 
their impact on firms’ R&D strategy selection and measure the possible effect over time.  
 While most previous literature studies the different impact of various R&D strategy options 
(make, buy and make-buy) have on innovation output, this study has enabled us to detect whether 
public institutions are  fostering  innovation R&D strategies according to its objectives pursued, and to 
assess whether public subsidies have a short- or long-term effect on commercial R&D activities. 
 The first significant conclusion emerging from this paper is that the source of the funding 
determines whether R&D support has only a contemporaneous or a more longer-term effect. Thus, the 
impact of State aid lasts for  two or three  periods, depending on the firm’s choice of R&D strategy,. 
One possibility is that the State may be directing its grants, which involve the largest sums of money, to 
larger-scale projects, based on the observation that the impact extends beyond two years after receipt of 
the funding. Another is that the State may be more successful at providing firms with the means to 
develop their R&D capacity through the  make-buy strategy.  
The second important finding from this study is that public funding for R&Ds, by definition, not 
just another factor influencing firms’ decisions to undertake the type of activities that will enhance their 
innovation output. We have been able to confirm that the source of the funding is one of the factors that 
determines the firm’s choice of R&D strategy, that is, whether it opts for in-house R&D, outsourced 
R&D or a combination of the two, a decision that will have an impact on its innovation performance.  
Specifically, our results show that State funding encourages firms to opt for the make-buy 
strategy, which, despite being strongly supported by the absorption capacity and open innovation 
theories,. Regional () funding, the least significant in terms of the sums involved, presents a less 
obvious pattern, although there is some indication that it encourages selection of the make-buy strategy 
as opposed to an exclusive make strategy. A possible explanation for this result might lie in the 
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diversity of conditions resulting from the decisions of 17 different Regional governments. Finally, the 
receipt of aid from other organizations, including the European Union,  increase the firm’s probability 
of adopting any R&D strategy, but the buy R&D strategy has the lowest probability to be selected This 
suggests that EU funding is having more effect as an incentive to perform in-house R&D, either 
exclusively or as a complement to technology outsourcing. This is consistent with the objectives and 
typology of European projects, which, being organized on a cooperative basis, require each 
participating firm to perform some activities in-house. 
This study has certain limitations deriving, among other factors, from the use of a database not 
specifically designed for our research objective. For example, the fact that we identify each firm’s 
adopted R&D strategy based on its responses in the  SBSS  may compromise our findings somewhat, 
because we cannot know whether the respondent fully understood the distinction between innovation 
strategy and R&D strategy; nor are we in possession of data regarding the main purposes for which the 
funds are used. Finally, the main limitation of this study is that the results and conclusions draw in this 
study comes from a specific sample and they only apply for large Spanish manufacturing firms. In 
order to draw general conclusions, further studies need to be developed.   
 19 
References 
Almus, M., and D. Czarnitkki. 2003. The effects of public R&D subsidies on firms’ innovation 
activities: the case of Eastern Germany. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 21: 226-36. 
Acosta, J. and A. Modrego. 2001. Public financing of cooperative R&D projects in Spain: the 
concerted projects under the National R&D Plan. Research Policy 30: 625-41 
Baumol, W. 2002. The free market innovation machine: Analyzing the growth miracle of Capitalism. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Bayona-Saéz, C. and T. Garcia-Marco. 2010. Assessing the effectiveness of the Eureka Program. 
Research Policy 39: 1375-86. 
Beneito, P., 2006. The innovative performance of in-house and contracted R&D in terms of patents and 
utility models. Research Policy 35: 502-37. 
Benfratello, L., and A. Sembenelli. 2002. Research joint ventures and firm level performance. Research 
Policy, 31: 493-507. 
Blanes, J.V., and I. Busom. 2004. Who participates in R&D subsidy programs? The case of Spanish 
manufacturing firms. Research Policy 33:1459-76. 
Branstetter, L. and M. Sakakibara. 1998. Japanese research consortia: a microeconometric analysis of 
industrial policy. The Journal of Industrial Economics 56: 207-33. 
Chen, Y., and Y. Yuan. 2007. The innovation strategy of firms: empirical evidence from the Chinese 
high-tech industry.  Journal of Technology Management in China 2: 145-53. 
. Cruz-Cazares, C., C. Bayona-Sáez, and T. García-Marco. 2010. R&D Strategies and Firm Innovative 
Performance: A Panel Data Analysis. International Journal of Innovation Management 14: 
1013-45 
 20 
Cho, D., and  P. Yu. 2000. Influential factors in the choice of technology acquisition mode: In 
empirical analysis of small and medium size firms in the Korean telecommunication industry. 
Technovation 20: 691-704. 
David, P., H. Bronwyn, and A. Toole. 2000. Is public R&D a complement or substitute for private 
R&D? A review of the econometric evidence. Research Policy 29: 497-529 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources of Australia. 2006. Behavioural additionality of 
Business R&D grant programmes in Australia. In Government R&D funding and company 
behaviour. Measuring behavioural additionality. OECD, 2006, 39-57 
Díaz-Díaz, N.L., I. Aguiar-Díaz, and P. De Saá-Pérez. 2008. The effect of technological knowledge 
assets on performance: The innovative choice in Spanish firms. Research Policy 37: 1515-29. 
Falk, R. 2006. Behavioural additionality of Austria’s industrial research promotion fund (FFF). In 
Government R&D funding and company behaviour. Measuring behavioural additionality. 
OECD, 2006, 59-74. 
Fariñas, J.C., and J. Jaumandreu (2000). Diez años de Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales 
(ESEE). Economía Industrial 329: 29–42. 
Fey, C.F., and J. Birkinshaw. 2005. External sources of knowledge, governance mode, and R&D 
Performance. Journal of Management 31: 597-621 
García-Quevedo, J. 2004. Do public subsidies complement business R&D? A Meta-Analysis of the 
econometric evidence. Kyklos 57: 87-102 
Georghiou, L., and D. Roessner. 2000. Evaluating technology programs: tools and methods. Research 
Policy 29: 657-78 
Georghiou, L., and B. Clarysse. 2006. Introduction and Synthesis. In Government R&D funding and 
company behaviour. Measuring behavioural additionality. OECD, 2006, 9-38 
 21 
Haro-Dominguez, M.C., D. Arias-Aranda, F.J. Lloréns-Montes, and A. Ruiz, 2007. The impact of 
absorptive capacity on technological acquisitions engineering consulting companies. 
Technovation 27: 417-25. 
Heijs, J., L. Herrera, M. Buesa, J. Sáiz, and P. Valadez. 2005. Efectividad de la política de cooperación 
en innovación: evidencia empírica española. Papeles de Trabajo Nº 1/05 del Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales. 
Hsiao, C. 1985. Benefits and limitations of panel data. Econometric Review 4: 121-74. 
Huggins, R. 2001. Inter-firm network policies and firm performance: evaluating the impact of 
initiatives in the United Kingdom. Research Policy 30: 443-58 
Hyvärinen, J. 2006. Behavioural additionality of public R&D funding in Finland. In Government R&D 
funding and company behaviour. Measuring behavioural additionality. OECD, 2006, 115-126. 
Jaffe, A. 2002. Building programme evaluation into the design of public research-support programmes. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18: 22-34. 
Jones, G.K., A. Lanctot, and H.J. Teegen. 2001. Determinants and performance impacts of external 
technology acquisition. Journal of Business Venturing 16: 255-83. 
Kessler, E.H., P.E. Bierly, and S. Gopalakrishnan. 2000. Internal vs. external learning in new product 
development: Effects on speed, cost and competitive advantage. R&D Management 30: 213-23. 
Klette, T.J, and J. Moen. 1999. From growth theory to technology policy — coordination problems in 
theory and practice. Nordic Journal of Political Economy 25: 53–74 
Klette, T.J., J. Moen, and Z. Griliches. 2000. Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce market failures? 
Microeconometric evaluation studies. Research Policy 29: 471-95. 
Lanctot A., and S.K. Swan. 2000. Technology acquisition strategy in an internationally competitive 
environment. Journal of International Management 6: 187–215. 
 22 
Lööf, H., and A. Hesmati. 2005. The impact of public funding on private R&D investment. New 
evidence from a firm level innovation study. CESIS, Electronic Working Paper Series. 
Luukkonen, T. 2000. Additionality of EU framework programmes. Research Policy 29: 711-24. 
Mol, M.J. 2005. Does being R&D intensive still discourage outsourcing? Evidence from Dutch 
manufacturing. Research Policy 34: 571-82. 
OECD. 1997. Proposed guidelines for collecting and interpreting technological innovation data: Oslo 
manual. OECD, Paris (Second (revised) Edition). 
OECD. 2006. Government R&D funding and company behaviour. Measuring behavioural 
additionality. OECD, 2006. 
Parmigiani, A. 2007. Why do firms both make and buy? An investigation of current sourcing. Strategic 
Management Journal 28: 285-311. 
Polt, W., and G. Streicher. 2005. Trying to capture additionality in Framework Programme 5 – main 
findings. Science and Public Policy 32: 367-73. 
Rabe-Hesketh, S., A. Skrondal, and A. Pickles .2004. GLLAMM Manual. U.C. Berkeley Division of 
Biostatistics Working Paper Series. Working Paper 160. 
http://www.bepress.com/ucbbiostat/paper160 
Roper, S., N. Hewitt-Dundas, and J. Love. 2004. An ex ante evaluation framework for the 
regionalbenefits of publicly supported R&D projects. Research Policy 33: 487-509. 
Salter, A., and B. Martin. 2001. The economic benefits of publicly funded basic research: a critical 
review. Research Policy 30: 509-32 
Santamaría, L., M.J. Nieto, and A. Barge-Gil. 2009. Beyond formal R&D: Taking advantage of other 
sources of innovation in low- and medium-technology industries. Research Policy 38: 507-17. 
 23 
Schmiedeberg, C. 2008. Complementarities of innovation activities: An empirical analysis of the 
German manufacturing sector. Research Policy 37: 1492-1503. 
Skrondal, A., and S. Rabe-Hesketh 2003. Multilevel logistic regression for polytomous data and 
rankings. Psychometrika 68: 267-287. 
Steyer, F. 2006. Behavioural additionality in Austria’s K-Plus competence centre programme. In 
Government R&D funding and company behaviour. Measuring behavioural additionality. 
OECD, 2006, 75-89. 
Tsai K., and J. Wang. 2009. External technology sourcing and innovation performance in LMT sectors: 
An analysis based on the Taiwanese Technological Innovation Survey. Research Policy 38: 
518-26.  
Veugelers, R., and B. Cassiman. 1999. Make and buy in innovation strategies: Evidence from Belgian 
manufacturing firms. Research Policy 28: 63-79.  
Veugelers, R., and B. Cassiman, 2006. In search of complementarity in innovation strategy: Internal 
R&D and external knowledge acquisition. Management Science 52: 68-82. 
 24
Table  1. Means, standard deviations and correlations among variables 
 
Variable  Mean Std.Dev RDS RFt SFt OFt LTI MTI HTI GP SIZE AGE 
RDS 2.3697 1.1644 1                   
RFt 0.3993 1.3004 0.2568* 1 
SFt 0.7068 1.7828 0.2812* 0.3410* 1 
OFt 0.2813 1.1456 0.1284* 0.2111* 0.2612* 1 
LTI 0.3623 0.4807 -0.2108* -0.1519* -0.1669* -0.1052* 1 
MTI 0.2552 0.436 0.018 0.025 0.0116 0.0318 -0.4413* 1 
HTI 0.3823 0.486 0.1923* 0.1278* 0.1547* 0.0755* -0.5931* -0.4607* 1 
GP 6.2022 7.5099 0.1669* 0.0391 0.1933* 0.0708* -0.1253* -0.1457* 0.2546* 1 
SIZE 18.04 1.0728 0.1391* 0.0427 0.1248* 0.0887* -0.0972* -0.0416 0.1335* 0.2764* 1 
AGE 35.851 25.6966 0.0255 -0.0278 0.0385 -0.0327 0.0776* -0.0611* -0.0219 0.1319* 0.0896* 1 
* p> 0.001 
    
  
       
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
Table 2.  
 Total number of firms  Firms that received funding  
 
Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
RF* 3941 15.50 101.02 375 162.91 288.86 
SF* 3941 53.11 410.10 582 359.63 1014.93 
OF* 3941 14.56 129.41 246 233.25 467.01 
* Thousands of Euros 
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Table 3 R&D  Strategies 
 No R&D as reference variable Make as  reference variable Buy as reference 
variable 
Variables Make  
(1) 
Buy  
(2) 
Make-Buy 
(3) 
Buy  
(4) 
Make-Buy (5) Make-Buy 
(6) 
 
Funding
 
RFt 1.3696* 
(0. 728) 
1.4256* 
(0. 737) 
1.4930** 
(0. 728) 
0. 0500 
(0. 072) 
0. 1359** 
(0. 054) 
0. 0005 
(0. 078) 
SFt 0. 9826*** 
(0. 288) 
0. 8446*** 
(0. 297) 
1.0543*** 
(0. 289) 
-0. 1115 
(0. 077) 
0. 1040*** 
(0. 038) 
0. 2186** 
(0. 107) 
OFt 2.4342*** 
(0.000) 
2.0770*** 
(0. 505) 
2.3697*** 
(0. 478) 
-0. 3364*** 
(0.111) 
-0. 0018 
(0. 035) 
0. 3064*** 
(0. 069) 
 
Funding
 -1 
RFt-1 0. 1359 
(0. 174) 
0. 1471 
(0. 184) 
0. 1893 
(0. 176) 
-0. 0011 
(0. 070) 
0. 0390 (0. 049) 0. 0279 
(0. 085) 
SFt-1 0. 3287** 
(0. 151) 
0. 3076** 
(0. 155) 
0.3687** 
(0. 150) 
-0. 0103 
(0. 058) 
0. 0550* 
(0. 031) 
0. 0173 
(0. 073) 
OFt-1 0. 1327 
(0. 207) 
-0. 0830 
(0. 225) 
0. 0869 
(0. 209) 
-0. 2335*** 
(0. 086) 
-0. 0548* 
(0. 032) 
0. 1784** 
(0. 083) 
 
Funding 
-2 
RFt-2 0.1034 
(0. 133) 
0. 1902 
(0. 164) 
0. 2559* 
(0. 132) 
0. 0734 
(0. 079) 
0. 1476*** 
(0. 049) 
0. 1315 
(0. 095) 
SFt-2 0. 1975 
(0. 121) 
0. 0681 
(0. 133) 
0. 2266* 
(0. 121) 
-0. 1108 
(0. 081) 
0. 0576 
(0. 039) 
0. 1090 (0. 074) 
OFt-2 0. 3180 
(0. 246) 
0. 1983 
(0. 262) 
0. 3144 
(0. 249) 
-0. 0595 
(0. 079) 
0. 0492 
(0. 032) 
0. 0953 
(0. 063) 
Technological 
Intensity 
MIT 0. 9865* 
(0. 543) 
1.4414*** 
(0. 554) 
1.2756** 
(0. 558) 
0. 4051 
(0. 464) 
0. 1710 
(0. 336) 
-0. 5734 
(0. 464) 
HIT 2.3373*** 
(0. 539) 
2.5886*** 
(0. 564) 
2.4820*** 
(0. 552) 
-0. 2008 
(0. 420) 
-0. 2530 
(0. 318) 
-0. 1742 
(0. 431) 
Percentage of 
Graduates 
GP 0. 0574* 
(0. 031) 
0. 0608** 
(0. 033) 
0. 0741** 
(0. 030) 
0. 0247 
(0. 025) 
0. 0345** 
(0. 017) 
0. 0006 
(0. 029) 
 Size 0. 7471*** 
(0. 226) 
0. 8997*** 
(0. 238) 
0. 8354*** 
(0. 229) 
0. 02340 
(0. 302) 
-0. 0735 
(0. 251) 
0. 0329 
(0. 625) 
 Age 0. 0012 
(0. 007) 
-0. 0115 
(0. 008) 
0. 0025 
(0. 007) 
-0. 0140** 
(0. 007) 
-0. 0007 
(0. 004) 
0. 013** 
(0. 006) 
Number of level 1 units 
Number of level 2 units 
Condition Number 
Log likelihood 
Variance (standard error) 
** p<0,05   *** p<0.01 
3109 
456 
31420.069-3008.70512.637 (1.961) 
3109 
456 
16009.559-3012.15966.935 
(0.925) 
3109 
456 
25003.975-
3330.81775.597 
(1.124) 
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